Incidents resulting in large losses
As an insurance company we have been studying ICS risks for several years now. Recently we have seen many incidents at major industries resulting in large losses, adding up to hundreds of millions. Hereby malicious software gained access to the business network and encrypted all data. More sophisticated versions made an inventory of all data repositories including on-line back-ups first, before starting their destructive work. Without their data victims were paralyzed, and their options were limited to paying the ransom and hoping for the best or re-building their systems from scratch using off-line back-ups, if available.
Ransomware can spread rapidly
Because ransomware can spread rapidly, a global company network could be affected within minutes. So far, the preferred response has been to cut all connections, effectively shutting down the network. And in today’s world, enterprise resource planning systems are key and without them business operations are impossible.
Even when industrial control systems are not compromised themselves all activities will stop sooner or later as in manufacturing plants production numbers and demands for raw materials are no longer processed. In hospitals, patient data is no longer available and findings can’t be reported.
In distribution centres it’s no longer possible to find pallet locations, to print address labels or to complete forms for customs. However, with the ICS themselves not being compromised they will operate as planned. They would shut down safely without physical loss. In the insurance business this is therefore commonly referred to as non-physical risk.
The hacking of ICS is considered a physical risk
However, the hacking of ICS is considered a physical risk as it may result in injuries, loss of life or material damages! Examples are less known to the general public and include events such as hacking into the controls of a New York dam (2013), setting a German steel mill on fire (2014), breaking down the Ukraine power grid (2015), compromising the safety of a refinery in the Middle East (2017), and the attacks on the Russian power grid (2019).
These examples may seem a little extreme for an average organisation as they involve state-sponsored hackers and high-profile targets. But make no mistake! As it happened with malware targeting common IT systems we have no doubt that the tools used in the above attacks will trickle down and become available for use by common criminals.